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Abstract 
 
Purpose The focus of the enquiry is on the research question of how stakeholder claims for 
transparency work as a means to support responsibility in the international supply chain. 
 
Design/methodology/approach This theoretical study analyses the relationship between 
stakeholder claims for corporate transparency and responsible business in the global context, 
and develops a conceptual model for further theoretical and empirical work. 
 
Findings The study finds that the call for corporate transparency is insufficient as a means to 
increase responsibility within international supply chains. The erroneous belief that 
stakeholder claims for transparency will lead to responsible behaviour, is identified as the 
Ôtransparency fallacyÕ. The fallacy emerges from the denial of opacity in organisations and 
the blindness to the conditions of international supply chains (including complexity, distance, 
and resistance) that work against attempts to increase transparency. 
 
Research limitations/implications Acknowledging the limits of the transparency mechanism 
in both management theory and practice is necessary in order to advance responsible business 
in the international arena. Being conceptual in nature, the generic limitations of the type of 
research apply. 
 
Practical implications While acknowledging opacity, corporate managers and stakeholders 
should focus on changing the supply chain conditions to support responsible behaviour. This 
includes reducing complexity, distance, and resistance in the supply network. 
 
Originality/value This study contests the commonly assumed link between corporate 
transparency and responsibility, and sheds light on the limits and unintended consequences of 
stakeholder attempts to impose transparency on business organisations. 
 
Keywords Transparency, corporate responsibility, supply chain, stakeholders, accountability, 
communication 
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1. Introduction 
 
As an outcome of the expansion of the neoliberal political regime, multinational 
corporations have become the harbingers of global development. In this era of 
corporate influence, problems of social inequality (Piketty, 2014) and environmental 
degradation (IPCC, 2014) have been augmented, and continue to worry the citizens of 
the planet. The increased power of the corporation has not generally resulted in the 
desired upsurge of responsibility in business organisations. While the modern 
companies are hesitant to voluntarily accept duties beyond their economic interests, 
the market mechanism is also shown to have severe limitations in moving 
organisations and societies towards sustainability (DesJardins, 1998; Heikkurinen and 
Bonnedahl, 2013). Nevertheless, there are continuous reformist efforts to make the 
corporation a responsible societal actor and to hold it accountable for its actions. 
 
One of these discourses that seek to align business practices with societal needs 
(Dahlsrud, 2008) and planetary boundaries (Rockstrm et al., 2009) takes place under 
the label of transparency. In fact, transparency of business organisations has become a 
twenty-first century mantra spanning sectorial boundaries. A range of actors tackling 
issues of sustainable development in the private, public, and third sectors has called 
for more corporate transparency as a solution to the prevailing unsustainability. 
Stakeholders of these corporationsÑincluding customers, investors, politicians, and 
non-governmental organisationsÑincreasingly demand more detailed and open 
disclosure on corporate actions and performance. A common response by 
corporations has been to publish various types of reports (e.g., Belal and Owen, 
2015). Self-reporting, however, has tended to omit to mention negative incidents 
(Reimsbach and Hahn, 2015), generally lacked credibility, and clashed with external 
stakeholder accounts (Gallhofer et al., 2006; Boiral, 2013; Rodrigue, 2014). To 
address these problems, third-party assurance has been offered as a panacea but the 
robustness, reliability, and consistency of the assurance models have been impugned 
too (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; Dando and Swift, 2003; Bepari and Mollik, 2016).  
 
Despite these commonly acknowledged challenges, transparency is still considered to 
be a central tenet in ensuring responsible practice in companies (Dubbink et al., 2008; 
Mena and Palazzo, 2012) and safeguarding responsibility along supply chains 
(Doorey, 2011; Egels-Zandn et al., 2015). The rationale behind the call for 
transparency is that corporate disclosure on environmental, social, and economic 
performance will lead to more responsible business practices as corporations are 
exposed to public scrutiny, and can thus be held accountable for their actions. But are 
these really the outcomes of the transparency claims for responsibility? And can 
demands for more transparency actually create the needed change towards sustainable 
development? 
 
In order to gain insights into the possibilities and limits of corporate transparency for 
sustainability, this paper examines transparency as a mechanism for responsible 
business behaviour in the global context. Thereby, our analysis zooms into the nature 
of the interrelation between the concepts of corporate transparency and responsibility 
in an international business environment. More specifically, the focus of the enquiry 
is on the research question of how stakeholder claims for corporate transparency work 
as a means to support responsibility in the international supply chain. The study 
challenges the often unduly optimistic notion of transparency as a central driver of 
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responsibility for sustainability in business organisations (e.g., Tapscott and Ticoll, 
2003; Vaccaro and Patio Echeverri, 2010; Palanski et al., 2011) and supply chains 
(e.g., Pagell and Wu, 2009; Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010; Doorey, 2011). The study 
finds that the call for corporate transparency as a means to increase responsibility of 
international business organisations is inadequate. The paper argues that it would be a 
fallacy to assume that the stakeholder claims for corporate transparency lead to 
corporate responsibility in international supply chains. This so-called transparency 
fallacy is likely to emerge once stakeholders assert that a focal company knowsÑor 
even can knowÑand give a full account of what is going on in and around its supply 
chains. The degree of transparency achievable is severely hampered by the 
contemporary supply chain conditions that surround multinational corporations, 
including the complexity of supply chains, the geographical and cultural distance 
between the members of those supply chains, and the resistance to transparency 
measures by suppliers. 
 
We suggest that stakeholder claims for more transparency may even turn out to be 
counterproductive for enhancing supply chain-wide responsibility, as the demands 
tend to push firms towards narcissistically praising or defensively palliating and 
camouflaging their activities by means of empty responsibility narratives. 
Furthermore, and importantly, the call for transparency may create and uphold myths 
around multinational corporations being capable of achieving transparency and thus 
of responsible business conduct. That being so, the requirement of transparency 
imposed on corporations may also become counterproductive in terms of both 
stakeholdersÕ and managersÕ time and resources. This paper proposes that developing 
responsible business behaviour requires both stakeholder and corporate efforts be 
directed towards changing the supply chain conditions that characterise the 
contemporary global business context. 
 
We draw on the stakeholder approach (Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 2010), as well 
as on streams of accounting and accountability research that problematize various 
forms of dissonances of corporate action and rhetoric (e.g., Boiral, 2013; Rodrigue, 
2014; Moerman and van der Laan, 2015) and explore the thus far relatively uncharted 
limits and boundaries of corporate transparency and responsibility (e.g., Roberts, 
2009; Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010; Macdonald, 2011). Although a few recent 
studies have already cast doubts on the assumption that transparency leads 
unequivocally to more sustainable business conduct (Unerman and Bennett, 2004) 
and sustainable supply chains (Egels-Zandn et al., 2015; Mol, 2015), so far no direct 
attempt has been made to conceptualise stakeholder claims as a possible hindrance to 
responsibility in business. The main contribution of the paper is hence to shed light on 
the limits and unintended consequences of stakeholder attempts to impose 
transparency on companies and supply chains. Thus, the theoretical contribution of 
the paper is two-fold. Firstly, the paper adds to the accounting and accountability 
literature that emphasizes the limits of transparency and accountability (e.g., Roberts, 
2009; Messner, 2009; Joannides, 2012; McKernan, 2012). Secondly, the paper 
connects to the sustainable supply chain management literature that far too 
simplistically sees transparency as the magic bullet, and often advocates external 
stakeholder pressure as an instrument for pushing supply chains towards greater 
accountability and sustainability of business practice (New, 2010).  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following section reviews 
and defines the core concepts of transparency, accountability, and responsibility in the 
corporate setting, and presents the assumed link between the three. The paper then 
addresses the various challenges companies face when requested by stakeholders to 
establish transparency, and the unwanted side effects. The paper concludes that 
acknowledging the limits of the transparency mechanism is necessary for advancing 
corporate responsibility in the international business arena. 
 
 
2. The Relevance of Transparency in Business 
 
In the contemporary global marketplace, the extraordinary power of corporations is 
widely acknowledged (e.g., Anderson and Cavanagh, 2000; Vitali et al., 2011). The 
large and successful multinational companies (MNCs), in particular, hold power over 
their suppliers and possibly even buyers due to their economic volumes (Robinson 
and Rainbird, 2013). Even decades ago, Galbraith (1973) noted that many business 
organisations have transformed from Ôprice takersÕ to Ôprice makersÕ, a transformation 
affecting not only the sovereignty of consumers but also the economic system as a 
whole. These MNCs are found to have both far-reaching opportunities to influence 
their constellation of network partners (Vitali et al., 2011), and the ability to choose 
the locations in which they invest and operate (Fuchs and Clapp, 2009). Given their 
power to also mould lifestyles (Michaelis, 2003) and influence the political and 
societal arena (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011), they can be seen to be responsible for 
their business conduct, having both negative duties such as inflicting no harm on their 
environment and positive duties such as investing organisational resources in shaping 
a social and institutional setting favourable to sustainability (Macdonald, 2011). 
 
In the network of companies, those that Ôusually (1) rule or govern the supply chain, 
(2) provide the direct contact to the customer, and (3) design the product or service 
offeredÕ are called focal (Seuring and Mller, 2008, p. 1699). Despite their central 
role in the supply chain, focal companies are not entirely free to do whatever they 
wish, as active stakeholders (usually customers, state representatives and non-
governmental organisations) act as watchdogs when their stakes are at issue (Freeman 
et al., 2010; Heikkurinen and Ketola, 2012). But for the watchdog mechanism to 
work, a degree of transparency is needed. For this reason, focal companies are asked, 
and sometimes required, to disclose not only their intra-organisational practices but 
also activities in their supply chains (Islam and McPhail, 2011; Okongwu et al., 2013; 
Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014). Without this disclosure, the stakeholders are unable to 
assess whether the companyÕs actions are jeopardising their stakes and if the company 
is meeting the stakeholdersÕ expectations in terms of sustainable development, for 
instance. 
 
In broad terms, transparency refers to openness and the communication of 
information in such a way that makes it easy for others to see what actions are being 
performed and which are not. Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2016, p. 1788) define 
transparency as Ôthe perceived quality of intentionally shared information from a 
senderÕ. In the context of business management, Bushman et al. (2004) define 
transparency as the availability of firm-specific information to external stakeholders. 
Recently, there has also been some debate about the rationale for granting 
stakeholders access to internal business information, including voices that see such 
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access as a human right if it is the precondition of meaningful political participation 
(Hazelton, 2013). Condensing these definitions, corporate transparency would mean 
acting in a way that enables others, both internal and external stakeholders, to 
perceive and understand what the company does, as well as the quality disclosure of 
the information needed for this; that is, transparency is not merely about sharing 
information but also about acting transparently. 
 
Nonetheless, corporate disclosure through various forms of reporting is at the centre 
of the transparency debate (Hess, 2007). According to the framework of the Global 
Reporting Initiative, as sustainability reporting becomes more and more mainstream 
for stock-listed companies or companies exceeding a certain size, the issue of lack of 
credibility moves to the forefront, for example as conceptualised through the 
reporting-performance portrayal gap (Adams, 2004). And consequently, assurance 
statements by third parties play an increasingly important role in enhancing credibility 
(Edgley et al., 2010) despite assurance initiatives at times being criticised for their 
limited scope, insufficient independence, arbitrary content, and opaque assurance 
processes (OÕDwyer and Owen, 2005; Grtrk and Hahn, 2016; Talbot and Boiral, 
2015a). In particular, assurance is said to miss the chance of creating further-reaching 
stakeholder-company dialogue on social and environmental issues (Jones and 
Salomon, 2010). In any case, mere assurance may be considered inadequate to 
establish the credibility of corporate communications, especially given that the degree 
of trust between companies and stakeholders is often low (Adams and Evans, 2004). 
 
More generally, according to Roberts (2009) transparency is intimately connected to 
accountability in the sense that transparency would be achieved if we could give a full 
account of ourselves. Accordingly, Harmon (1995, p. 25) states that Ôaccountability 
refers to an authoritative relationship in which one person is formally entitled to 
demand that another answer forÑthat is provide an account ofÑhis or her actionsÕ. 
Hence, the call for transparency establishes a hierarchical relationship between 
corporations and their stakeholders with the latter in an authoritative watchdog role. 
In this respect, Roberts (2009) referring to Althusser (1971) explains the essence of 
accountability through the metaphor of a street scene where an individualÑin our 
case the companyÑis hailed by some authoritative forceÑin our case the 
stakeholdersÑÔHey you there!Õ. By answering this call, the company generates 
narratives that creates its identity and through which it gains recognition, that is, the 
social licence to operate (Mel and Armengou, 2016); simultaneously, however, these 
narratives are subjected to the judgement of the stakeholders. Thus transparency 
reveals its ambivalent character as it prompts defensive and self-assertive justification 
as well as corporate narcissism (Boiral, 2013). Or, as Roberts (2009, p. 958) puts it, 
Ôtransparency works to advertise an ideal against which we will always fail so that it 
plays with my fears of being exposed and humiliated whilst at the same time 
encouraging me to take pride in what is disclosedÕ. 
 
 
3. Corporate Responsibility and Stakeholders 
 
The contemporary debate on corporate responsibility has attracted a considerable 
amount of attention among business pundits and academics. It seems that the 
transformation to sustainable societies is largely dependent on how economic actors, 
particularly corporations, can be changed towards acknowledging and fostering social 
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and societal value as well as respecting natural capital (Welford, 1997). One could 
therefore expect companies to consider their operationsÕ impact on social and 
ecological systems in order to extend their accountability, from investors and 
shareholders towards a wide range of stakeholders (Adams and McNicholas, 2007). 
However, there is a conflict inherent in the relationship between responsibility and 
accountability in a sense that accountability relies on responsibility but the processes 
of rendering accountability undermine responsibility at the same time; Òthe processes 
of accountability draw us [É] into explaining and justifying to the community, and 
thereby it threatens to undo the singularity that is crucial to moral responsibilityÓ 
(McKernan, 2012, p. 259). Furthermore, the reliable identification of responsible 
business behaviour on the part of companies remains elusive. For example, if we take 
the case of Royal Dutch Shell and its oil spills in Nigeria (Pegg and Zabbey, 2013), 
responsibility remains a vague concept. Is it meaningful to talk about responsible 
business when an oil company agrees to settle with the local affected community for 
oil spills and promises to mitigate future risk, but at the same time continues its 
business activities that deplete fossil fuel reserves and warm the climate at the 
expense of future generations and the environment? On the other hand, any attempt to 
offset the harm caused is surely better than nothing but can be considered inadequate 
to establish responsible conduct. Another more recent case that highlights the problem 
of the responsible business discourse is VolkswagenÕs emission scandal. This German 
car manufacturing giant was found to cheat with the emissions tests to downplay the 
real impacts of their vehicles on the environment. Yet, the corporation claims on its 
website that Ôsocial responsibility has long been at the heart of our corporate cultureÕ 
(VW, 2015). However, while there are several examples that shed light on 
malpractice (e.g. Banerjee and Bonnefous (2011) on the French nuclear industry and 
Owen (2005) on Enron), there are also MNCs that are praised for their excellence, for 
instance Patagonia (McSpirit, 1999) with its calls for reduced consumption. Whether 
or not Patagonia has succeeded in actually reducing the overall consumption is 
another question. The expansion of their manufacturing units has problematically led 
to increases in both the use of natural resources and the production of climate 
emissions. 
 
Be that as it may, it is apparent that corporate responsibility, as well as the lack of it, 
is an empirical phenomenon (Heikkurinen, 2013). Several studies and reports posit 
that companies take care of the environment and are considerate in sociocultural 
matters beyond the legal and regulatory requirements (Dahlsrud, 2008). Suggested 
reasons for these responsibility discourses and practices span mere profit-making 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), risk management (Bebbington et al., 2008), political 
ideology (Chin et al., 2013), the new political role of businesses in the globalising 
world (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011) and the oppression of others (Banerjee, 2007) to 
the moral high ground (Ketola, 2014) and spirituality (Pruzan, 2008). Owing to the 
breadth of viewpoints, a precise and all-inclusive definition of corporate responsibility 
is difficult to establish (for a review see Heikkurinen and Mkinen, 2016). This paper 
adopts a definition of corporate responsibilityÑwhich comprises corporate 
environmental responsibility, corporate sociocultural responsibility and corporate 
economic responsibilityÑas Ôconsideration for others, both the salient and fringe 
stakeholders, including the natural environment and other non-human actors, that is 
manifested in corporate discourses and/or actions beyond the contextual legal 
complianceÕ (Heikkurinen, 2013, p. 33). In this respect, stakeholders are crucial for 
constituting corporate responsibility; they are the entities to which companies are 
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supposed to respond to and indeed represent the authorities that demand transparency 
and accountability from corporations and their supply chains (Roberts, 2009). At the 
same time, stakeholders are supposed to create cognitive dissonance among managers 
and spur change towards greater accountability of corporate action (Adams and 
Whelan, 2009). 
 
Freeman (1984) introduced the stakeholder approach to managing a business 
organisation successfully, which has now become popular and broadly utilised in 
studies of corporate responsibility (Dahlsrud, 2008). According to this approach, a 
stakeholder is defined as Ôany group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organizationÕs objectivesÕ (Freeman, 1984, p. 46), and the 
consideration of the expectations of both primary (e.g., customers, communities, 
employees, financers or suppliers) and secondary stakeholders (e.g., government, 
competitors, consumer advocate groups, special interest groups or the media) is 
considered to be the key to economic success and survival of the company (Freeman 
et al., 2007, 2010). Hart and Sharma (2004) underline that the groups at the fringe of 
a firmÕs operations (i.e. the poor, weak, isolated, non-legitimate and even non-human 
stakeholders) also matter, as they possess knowledge important to the organisation. A 
stakeholder analysis is presumed to contribute to maximising both shareholder value 
(Mitchell et al., 1997) and Ôcompetitive imaginationÕ (Hart and Sharma, 2004), as 
well as to connect business to ethics (Freeman et al., 2010). Nevertheless, from a 
viewpoint of inclusive, responsible business, a challenge inherent in the stakeholder 
approach is selecting those stakeholders whose concerns matter in business decisions, 
to weigh the concerns of stakeholders and the business in cases of conflicts of interest, 
as well as to distinguish real response to manifested stakeholder expectations from 
merely ostentatious activities that may be labelled as so-called impression 
management (Clatworthy and Jones, 2006; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011; Guillamon-
Saorin et al., 2012). 
 
The stakeholder approach prescribes that the main goal of corporate responsibility is 
to create value for key stakeholders and fulfil responsibilities to them (Freeman and 
Velamuri, 2008). These key stakeholders are often the most powerful, not the 
stakeholders at the ÔfringeÕ, such as local communities, animals, or the unborn. ÔTo 
achieve greater consensus [É], all stakeholders (both economically powerful and 
economically weak) need to more readily engage in open, honest and cooperative 
discourse, being prepared to acknowledge and accept the force of the stronger 
argument and modify their views accordinglyÕ (Unerman and Bennett, 2004, p. 703). 
Such a discourse could, for example, be led by dialogic accounting techniques that 
aims at breaking the predominance of shareholder interests and drives stakeholder 
accountability and ecological sustainability (Brown, 2009; Brown and Dillard, 2015; 
Brown et al., 2015). But even if the stakeholder approach is as inclusive and 
democratic as theoretically possible, for example by harnessing the use of social 
media for engaging stakeholders in continuous exchange (Manetti and Bellucci, 
2016), the non-human environment and the needs of future generations are likely to 
remain under-represented, as these stakeholders have no direct voice (Andersen et al., 
2012). Moreover, a firm managed in accordance with the stakeholder approach does 
not, and indeed cannot, acknowledge the intrinsic value of its stakeholders in its 
decision-making. Thus, the responsibility for an action becomes narrowly measured 
merely in terms of its utility. This illustrates that while the engagement of 
stakeholders is related to corporate responsibility it neither signifies nor equates to 
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corporate responsibility (Greenwood, 2007). As Greenwood (2007, p. 31) notes: 
ÔStakeholder engagement may or may not involve a moral dimension and, hence, is 
primarily a morally neutral practiceÕ. 
 
 
4. Transparency in International Supply Chains 
 
As a growing part of the overall impact of a company stems from purchased materials 
and primary production, the need for transparency has increasingly been extended 
beyond the narrow confines of the company to embrace its direct suppliers, or even 
the whole supply and distribution chain (Egels-Zandn et al., 2015; Mol, 2015; Godar 
et al., 2016). Egels-Zandn et al. (2015, p. 95) define supply chain transparency as the 
Ôdisclosure of information about supplier names, sustainability conditions at suppliers, 
and buyersÕ purchasing practicesÕ. The importance of transparency for stakeholders is 
repeatedly underlined in the scholarly debate (e.g., Doorey, 2011). Transparency is 
supposed to rebalance the power asymmetry between a company and its stakeholders 
in favour of the latter; hence, by demanding transparency stakeholders hold 
corporations accountable for their behaviour (Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010). 
Ultimately, the goal is to globally uphold at least a minimum set of social and 
ecological standards (Chan and Ross, 2003). 
 
However, transparency is not necessarily always beneficial for actors in civil society. 
Mol (2015), for instance, raises a concern that companies could abuse their powerful 
position within society for hijacking the notion of transparency in order to monitor the 
environmental impacts and resource use of consumers, hence reversing the direction 
of information disclosure and the hierarchical relationship and putting companies into 
the authoritative position of demanding transparency and hence accountability (cf. 
Roberts, 2009). For example, companies may use smart utility meters for creating 
detailed patterns of water and electricity consumption of citizen-consumers, price 
reduction card systems for monitoring individual shopping behaviour, or health and 
safety provisions for increasingly controlling workers in factories (Mol, 2015). 
Furthermore, reporting through the quasi-standard guidelines of the Global Reporting 
Initiative has failed to shift power in favour of civil society and the non-human world. 
According to Dingwerth and Eichinger (2010) transparency policies persist despite 
their failure to empower stakeholders by their function of ÔcopingÕ; the policies 
somehow manage the inert and difficult to change fundamental issue of irresponsible 
production and consumption patterns of modern societies without actually resolving 
it. 
 
Although there is some reason behind transparency neither effectively empowering 
stakeholders nor guiding companies towards assuming greater responsibility, focal 
companies have much at stake when stakeholders push them towards assuming 
responsibility for their supply chains: brand reputation, further investment, and the 
likelihood of governmental action, to name just a few. In fact, there is often a clear 
business case for focal companies to take instances of non-compliance on the part of 
their suppliers seriously, especially in cases when there is a risk of provoking 
campaigns by critical stakeholders (e.g., environmental activist groups) that can be 
further fuelled by the media (Deegan and Islam, 2014). There are abundant examples 
of corporations being blamed for their suppliersÕ operations and business practices 
with adverse impacts. For example, Nestl was blamed for rainforest deforestation, 
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Nike for child labour, Apple for sweatshop work conditions and Mattel for the use of 
toxic materials (Wolf, 2014). However, even if transparency and visibility is assumed 
to be one of the key aspects of supply chain management (e.g., Carter et al., 2015) and 
sustainable supply chain management (e.g., Pagell and Wu, 2009; Busse et al., 2017), 
it is obviously exceptionally difficult for companies to deliver transparency 
throughout their supply chains. 
 
One main reason for this is that in the contemporary economic system, international 
supply chains are extremely complex and constantly changing: ÔCompanies operate in 
an increasingly complex world: Business environments are more diverse, dynamic, 
and interconnected than everÑand far less predictableÕ (Reeves et al., 2016, p. 46). 
While spatial and temporal dynamism is an unavoidable state of affairs (made famous 
by HeraclitusÕ of Ephesus notion that ÔYou could not step twice into the same riverÕ), 
complexity mainly derives from multiple supplier tiers (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014) 
and second- and third-tier suppliers that are often beyond the comprehension and the 
control of the focal company (Wilhelm et al., 2016). Extending supply chains towards 
the notion of supply networks points to the multitude of suppliers on each supplier 
level and how the arrays of suppliers are intertwined. Some of the largest companies 
in the world have tens of thousands of organisations in their production and 
distribution networks making the transactions and other activities very hard to 
manage, or even count. Indeed, in these cases it is almost impossible for focal 
companies to develop adequate control mechanisms and to build up the trusting 
relationships that safeguard supplier and distributor cooperation, which is necessary to 
encourage responsible business behaviour throughout the supply chain (Das and 
Teng, 1998). Nevertheless, Chen and Paulraj (2004) see supply chains as Ôthe 
challenge of designing and managing a network of interdependent relationships 
developed and fostered through strategic collaborationÕ (Chen and Paulraj, 2004, p. 
119). While the collaborative approach emphasises the value added through an inter-
organisational combination of resources eventually leading to inter-organisational 
competitive advantage (Gold et al., 2010), it scarcely reflects the phenomenon of 
extensive value capture by the downstream actors (often in the northern hemisphere) 
to the detriment of the upstream actors (often in the southern hemisphere) (Gold et al., 
2016). The complexity of international supply chains is thus not limited to the amount 
of transactions and subcontracting, but also extends to cover the multifaceted nature 
of power dynamics (Schleper et al., 2015). This unequal power distribution along the 
chain is particularly evident for example in the cases of international food 
(Johannessen and Wilhite, 2010) and textile (Perry and Tower, 2013) supply chains. 
 
Moreover, while research on international supply chains has traditionally tended to 
focus on the vertical (mostly buyer-seller dyads), recent studies have also explored the 
horizontal dimension of supply chains (e.g., Neilson and Pritchard, 2010; De Neve, 
2014; Silvestre, 2015). The horizontal dimension embraces the formal and informal 
institutional contexts (cultural, legal, political etc.) that shape production processes 
and labour conditions along international supply chains. While the local values and 
norms may collide with the values and norms of focal companies (and standard-
setting international bodies such as the United Nations) or of other organisations in 
the vertical dimension, the collision of cultural preferences and the related 
complexities often remain hidden (see Lund-Thomsen, 2008). It is apparent how the 
specific local embeddedness of production (and servicing) processes along 
international supply chains has been neglected since the development of swift and 
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cheap transport abetted the illusion of homogeneous production in the global 
marketplace. Be that as it may, it is clear how local political, linguistic, social and 
cultural differences add to the complexity of international supply chain management 
that firms face while aiming to establish responsible supply along their chains 
(Pedersen and Andersen, 2006). 
 
 
5. Identifying the Transparency Fallacy 
 
When external stakeholders, including consumers, insist on corporate transparency as 
an expression of corporate responsibility, they are likely to be taken in by the 
transparency fallacy. This fallacy is an erroneous belief that stakeholder claims for 
corporate transparency will lead to increased corporate responsibility in international 
supply chains. This misbelief is founded on an assumption that a business 
organisation operating with international supply chains is, or could become, 
transparent in its operations. In other words, there is a denial of opacity in 
organisations. And certainly, the more complex and multifarious the business 
organisation is, the greater the degree of opacity. Owing to the dynamic complexity of 
international and multicultural supply chainsÑencompassing the sourcing, primary 
production, manufacturing, distribution, retailing and consumption of goods and 
servicesÑas well as the geographical and cultural distances between the members of 
those supply chains, focal companies could be regarded as systematically unaware of 
what they are ÔorchestratingÕ. This is reflected in a more general argument of opacity 
that is part of every individualÑand hence also every organisationÑand which 
cannot be accounted for: ÔTherefore, I cannot explain everything I have done, and I 
cannot tell a coherent story of who I am and what I have experienced because my 
experience and conduct have not been motivated exclusively by my conscious efforts 
and deliberations and because the minutiae and complexity of what happens will often 
exceed my recognition and memoryÕ (Messner, 2009, p. 925). This opacity in 
organisations implies that focal companies are not able to give a full account of the 
practices within their supply chains, even if they hold an extraordinarily powerful 
position therein, since they even cannot give full account of their own organisational 
practices. By stating that companies do not, and even cannot, have full information 
about production conditions in their supply chains, we by no means wish to imply that 
companies are always eager to know about those issues, or would always act 
differently even if they knew how things really are. Rather, we intend to show how 
the stakeholder claims for transparency influence business activities and, in particular, 
the implications for corporate responsibility. 
 
According to the logic of the stakeholder approach (Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 
2010), when pressured by external stakeholders who threaten to substantially tarnish 
their brand reputation, to facilitate adverse government intervention or to deter 
investors, focal companies have to take their stakeholdersÕ concerns very seriously. 
When their stakeholders lobby for transparency in a firmÕs supply chain which that 
firm cannot easily (and certainly not fully) provide, such companies tend to take 
transparency claims literally and generate narratives to avoid blame (Hood, 2007). 
Such narratives may be abundant in length but usually do not capture the essence of 
the circumstances and activities in the upstream production. In this sense, companies 
are prone to generate an illusion of transparency; by trying to make the invisible 
visible companies might just create Ômore information, less understanding, and in 
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particular more information, less trustÕ (Strathern, 2000, p. 313). Aiming to satisfy the 
manifested stakeholder expectations, corporate management might feel forced to 
engage in the so-called impression management. At a minimum, the stakeholder 
claims for transparency encourage managers to develop narratives about corporate 
performance that over-emphasise good news and downplay bad news, in other words, 
managers engage in impression management by means of enhancement (Clatworthy 
and Jones, 2006; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011; Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2012). This 
image-enhancement strategy also refers to the discourse on corporate transparency 
itself, meaning that corporations present themselves as transparent or on a route to 
transparency. Previous research also showed that these narratives can become even 
more extensive and cognitively more complex if companies face negative 
organisational outcomes or allegations which cause them to take refuge in 
retrospective sense-making (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2011). Moreover, Boiral 
(2016) found that when companies face stakeholder claims regarding socially 
sensitive issues, they may legitimize their impacts through the use of various rhetoric 
techniques of neutralization (Talbot and Boiral, 2015b). This is in particular the case 
if the issue at hand may be seen as non-measurable and potentially unaccountable, 
such as the specific impacts of mining companies on biodiversity (cf. Jones and 
Solomon, 2013; Tregida, 2013). Such techniques of neutralization involve various 
forms of justification and various degrees of recognition of negative corporate 
impacts. Mining companies may simply deny significant negative impacts on 
biodiversity; distance themselves from self-reported negative impacts by 
contextualizing and relativizing them, and by highlighting uncertainties as well as the 
legality of corporate operations; claim an overall positive or at least neutral impact; or 
dilute own responsibilities by pointing to other actors or adverse circumstances 
(Boiral, 2016). 
 
These impression management techniquesÑof which the aforementioned ones of 
image-enhancement, retrospective sense-making and neutralization are only 
examplesÑincrease the amount of corporate narratives without contributing to 
genuine transparency of business conduct. In fact, the aim of corporate transparency 
clashes with the empirical phenomenon that business operations have been and are 
still becoming more global: with greater reach, the complexity of supply chains keeps 
increasing and the possibility of transparency continues to decrease. From the value 
creation perspective of the stakeholder approach, such strategically optimised, 
somewhat hollow narratives may not be problematic, as they can contribute to 
maximising shareholder value and even meeting the expectations of the most salient 
stakeholders. False transparency narratives, however, may be neither a satisfactory 
means nor an end to connect business and ethics for the goal of sustainable change. 
They cement the status quo and represent indeed a step backwards in the quest for 
new forms of accounting, reporting, and accountability that a sustainable world would 
require (Atkins et al., 2015). 
 
This mechanism of stakeholders lobbying for transparency from a position of 
authority and corporations responding through narratives of responsibility that prove 
rather elusive then perpetuates itself. On the one hand, accountable corporationsÑ
corporations that accept accountability or on which accountability is imposedÑcan 
no longer escape the logic of accountability; Ôonce I account, I have entered the logic 
of accountability, implicitly agreeing that there is a legitimate need to give an 
accountÕ (Messner, 2009, p. 927). The accountable company is condemned to fail in 
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the eyes of the critical stakeholders, no matter whether it narcissistically praises or 
defensively camouflages and palliates its (supply chainÕs) business conduct; in this 
respect Roberts (2009, p. 958) reveals the terrifying nature of transparency as an 
Ôideal against which we [multinational corporations] will always failÕ. On the other 
hand, stakeholders are largely unaware that it is indeed their relentless demands for 
transparency that increasingly push companies towards creating narratives which lay 
a smokescreen for corporate irresponsibility. These demands persuade companies to 
enhance, repair and defend their narcissistic self-image and thereby prevent corporate 
self-reflection, and block a company acquiring insights into its own incoherent 
narratives and imperfections and a beneficial attitude of learning (Roberts, 2009), 
which would bring corporations back on track to genuinely assuming greater 
responsibility towards society and the natural environment (Atkins et al., 2015). 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
The stakeholder approach to business and society relationships implies that 
consumers, NGOs and other stakeholders adopt a watchdog role to contain corporate 
irresponsibility that puts their interests at risk (Heikkurinen and Ketola, 2012). In 
order to fulfil this role and to serve as a counterweight to corporate power, 
stakeholders urge corporations and their associated supply chains to be transparent 
(e.g., Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014; Garcia-Sanchez 
et al., 2014). This lobbying for corporate transparency suggests that stakeholders are 
taken in by the transparency fallacy, the erroneous belief that large companies, and 
their supply chains, can become sufficiently transparent and that this transparency 
will lead to corporate responsibility. In trying to impose comprehensive accountability 
on internationally operating focal firms, consumers and other stakeholders tend to 
neglect that many corporate managers lack knowledge of and control over their 
suppliersÕ transactions (beyond the first tier, certainly) owing to supply chain 
complexity (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014), resistance from suppliers and the diversity 
in terms of sociocultural embeddedness of supplier behaviour (Schleper et al., 2015). 
 
By pushing for transparency, stakeholders might also be disregarding the point that 
there will always be some opacity (Messner, 2009) within every organisation, and 
great degrees of opacity in the global production chains and networks. Hence there is 
a compelling argument that focal, multinational companies and their management 
cannot give a full or a sufficient account of their own actions. Yet stakeholder 
demands impose the logic of accountability on the focal firm according to which an 
organisation Ôcannot not accountÕ since even a Ôdenial to give an account may be 
interpreted as an accountÕ (Messner, 2009, p. 927), despite all the actual limits to 
(supply chain) accountability and therefore transparency outlined above. In fact, the 
demand for transparency establishes an authoritative relationship (Roberts, 2009) 
between stakeholders and corporation that tends to encourage companies to justify 
and camouflage their activities defensively or present a flattering image of their 
conduct in order to acquire admiration and recognition (Boiral, 2013). In any case, 
stakeholder claims for transparency push corporate managers towards generating 
narratives that create a mere illusion of transparency (Strathern, 2000), guided by 
various forms of impression management (Clatworthy and Jones, 2006; Merkl-Davies 
et al., 2011; Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2012). 
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Owing to the limits of knowledge and control, as well as the concept of transparency, 
these narratives about responsibilityÑno matter whether inclined towards blame 
avoidance or self-praise, or bothÑare unlikely to satisfy critical stakeholders in their 
alleged authoritative position. It may be noted here that this more or less commanding 
position does not automatically grant access to the independent information crucial 
for verifying company accounts (OÕSullivan and OÕDwyer, 2009), such as counter-
accounts and shadow accounts authored by third parties (Gallhofer et al., 2006; 
Cooper et al., 2011; Boiral, 2013). Uninformed and dissatisfied stakeholders will thus 
call for amendments to corporate accounts and companies will have to respond 
although it is quite unlikely that providing more or ÔbetterÕ company disclosure could 
solve the problem at hand. It hence now becomes clear that these stakeholder 
demands for transparencyÑtogether with the intrinsic necessity for companies of not 
meeting themÑare the starting point and the perpetuating mechanism of the 
transparency fallacy by which stakeholders are easily taken in (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the process of the so-called transparency fallacy (the dotted arrows 
in the model) that falsely assumes that stakeholder demands for corporate 
transparency lead to responsible behaviour on the part of corporations in the 
international supply chain. This paper has argued that stakeholder claims for 
transparency lead to responsibility narratives, rather than actual responsible 
behaviour owing to the general opacity in organisations and the prevailing supply 
chain conditions. Examples of such conditions are high levels of complexity 
(characterised by an extensive, dynamic supply network where parts interact with 
other parts in multiple ways), high levels of distance between actors (in geographical, 
linguistic, and cultural terms) and high levels of resistance within the supply chain (by 
suppliers and other stakeholders). 
 
 
Figure 1. The Emergence of the Transparency Fallacy 
 
 
 
 
The transparency fallacy that is blind to both opacity and the role of the supply chain 
conditions is detrimental to companies, as well as to society and the environment, as it 
wastes the resources of stakeholders and businesses. The time and energy used to 
provide all the supplier checks and assurance mechanisms appearsÑbased on our 
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analysisÑto be largely in vain if they do not substantially change contemporary 
supply chain conditions. The blind pursuit of transparency may even do a disservice 
to the cause of responsibility and hence sustainable development. For instance, 
organisations and their stakeholders being kept busy seeking better technical solutions 
and auditorsÕ reliability checks may be distracting attention from the fundamental lack 
of responsibility of certain business practices themselves. For example, in the case of 
Royal Dutch Shell, the unsustainability of the whole fossil fuel industry is not the 
centre of attention, as it perhaps should be if we are really serious about reducing CO2 
emissions globally. Even if oil companies could be compelled to provide increased 
transparency of their corporate conduct, it would not change the fact that fossil fuel 
corporations belong to the past (as the label already suggests) if climate change is to 
be tackled. It is important to note here that a transparent act does not alone denote that 
it is ethically sound: it is just a more visible act. 
 
Making the notion of transparency a meaningful and more effective concept will 
require that the mechanism of the transparency fallacy be dismantled. On the one 
hand, this might be accomplished by proactively accepting the limitations of 
accountability and transparency, aiming for Ôhumility and acceptance in relation to the 
[imperfect] self and generosity in relation to similarly limited othersÕ (Roberts, 2009, 
p. 967). Acknowledging the limits of accountability can indeed be liberating and 
beneficial for ethical business conduct since Ômaking people accountable may easily 
turn into a blame game that can effectively impede us from assuming our collective 
responsibility for problems that affect us allÕ (Messner, 2009, p. 936), such as various 
kinds of sustainability-related problems. In the context of international supply chains 
this would also mean releasing stakeholders from their watchdog function to some 
extent (Heikkurinen and Ketola, 2012), so that companies can once again internalise 
moral responsibility for their actions (Joannides, 2012) towards social and ecological 
systems. In this way, communication and interaction with stakeholders would no 
longer be any threat to companies, but would instead help develop the corporate 
capability for reflection, which stimulates organisational learning (Roberts, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, the dismantling of the transparency fallacy necessitates more focus 
on the supply chain conditions that surround multinational business organisations. 
The prevailing supply chain conditions (e.g., complexity, distance, and resistance) are 
working against attempts to improve transparency. On the level of supply chain 
design, this signifies that transparency could be fostered by reducing the complexity 
and distance of the economic organisation to a comprehensible state, as well as 
forming chain constellations and business operations that provoke less resistance from 
the suppliers. In practice, this would mean bringing the locations of consumption and 
production closer to one another, in other words, shortening the supply chain. In this 
kind of simpler and more local business setting, stakeholders would then be better 
able (in relative terms) to perform their role of watchdogs, if such a role remains 
necessary. The suggestion of downscaling the economyÕs complexity by 
approximating the locations of consumption and production is a current trend in 
supply chain management termed Ôre-shoringÕ (e.g., Gray et al., 2013). The notion of 
a more local economy has also received support from several economists, most 
notably from Schumacher (1973), Georgescu-Roegen (1975), Daly (1992), and 
Latouche (2007), as well as the local produce movement (Norberg-Hodge, 1999; 
Bauermeister, 2016). 
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The current research being purely conceptual in nature makes it subject to the generic 
limitations of such research, above all the missing empirical corroboration of the 
mechanism of the transparency fallacy proposed. Despite this limitation the paper 
makes various contributions to the knowledge base and will guide follow-up 
empirical research in the research streams of accounting and accountability as well as 
sustainable supply chain management. The paper contributes to explaining the 
widespread empirical phenomenon of a mismatch between corporate disclosure and 
action that has been repeatedly addressed in accounting and accountability research 
(see e.g., Boiral, 2013; Rodrigue, 2014; Moerman and van der Laan, 2015). It warns 
against over-emphasising the watchdog role of stakeholders intended to make 
companies behave more responsibly and sustainably, and instead calls for greater 
emphasis on the influence of the ethics of the organisation and the supply chain 
conditions that shape corporate behaviour. At the same time, the study questions a 
central tenet of sustainable supply chain management research, that is, the assumed 
causal link between supply chain transparency and the triple bottom line (i.e. social, 
environmental and economic) supply chain performance (e.g., Pagell and Wu, 2009; 
Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010; Doorey, 2011). Thereby, without advocating supply 
chain secrecy (Mol, 2015), we add to the few supply chain studies that cast doubts on 
whether transparency within supply chains is always achievable and whether the 
transparency discourse is always desirable or beneficial to the consumers and society 
at large (Egels-Zandn et al., 2015; Mol, 2015). Simultaneously, we extend the body 
of research that explores the limits of accountability and transparency (e.g., Roberts, 
2009; Messner, 2009; Joannides, 2012; McKernan, 2012) into the specific context of 
international supply chains, and we provide an argument for the localisation of 
production and consumption practices. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper has critically examined corporate transparency as a mechanism for 
responsible business in the global context. The focus of the enquiry was on the 
research question of how stakeholder claims for transparency work as a means to 
support corporate responsibility in the international supply chain. 
 
The short answer is ÔpoorlyÕ. The study suggests that, in the context of complex 
international supply chains, the call for corporate transparency may not be serving its 
purpose of holding companies accountable for their social and environmental impacts, 
and fostering responsibility behaviour. On the contrary, the study finds that the call 
for corporate transparency is an inadequate means to increase responsibility in 
business, and suggests that it is a fallacy to assume that stakeholder demands for 
corporate transparency lead to corporate responsibility in international supply chains. 
This process is hindered by general opacity in organisations as well as the 
contemporary supply chain conditions, such as complexity, distance, and resistance. 
 
The analysis also points to the limitations of the corporate responsibility model, which 
is mainly driven and enforced by the external stakeholders of the corporation, and 
calls for a more critical research agenda that incorporates structural and ethical 
aspects in investigating transparency and responsibility in supply chains. That is, 
rather than uniformly and merely calling for more transparency, both scholars and 
public and private decision-makers, could draw careful attention to the limits of 
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transparency and accountability ideas, to the specific conditions that surround firms in 
the international business arena, and to the question of which structural factors 
(including complexity, distance, and resistance) may prevent attempts to increase 
transparency throughout supply chains. The effects of transparency on corporate 
social and environmental sustainability need to be further critically scrutinized by 
follow-up studies that complement conceptual reasoning with empirical research 
designs. As our paper suggests, the straight causal link may be deliberately questioned 
and replaced by more differentiated, contingent, and dynamic inter-relationships 
between transparency and responsibility as well as sustainability, also considering 
potential unwanted side effects of treating transparency as a panacea for irresponsible 
and unsustainable corporate business practice. Accounting and accountability research 
may further theorize about reasons and implications of a mismatch between corporate 
disclosure and action, for single companies and extended towards supply chains. At 
the same time, new accounting frames and techniques may be explored to support 
sound forms of corporate accountability and make companies internalise moral 
responsibility, by discouraging corporate behaviour that is largely symbolic and 
superficial and making companies actively engage beyond their own operations. 
Furthermore, while singling out companies and industries and demonstrating their 
irresponsibility can help draw attention to examples of concern, there is a dire need to 
critically evaluate the potentials and pitfalls of the economic system as a whole, as 
well as the institutions and ideologies that continue to produce and support the 
irresponsible corporate behaviour in question. 
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